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CASES NOTED
LABOR LAW-INFLAMMATORY RACIAL PROPAGANDA
IN REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
The National Labor Relations Board held a representation election
in two Georgia plants, located in towns of 3,000 and 1,000 population.
The employer used propaganda pictures and publications which portrayed
unions as emphasizing racial integration.' The union lost the election.
Held, election set aside and new election ordered: propaganda which
"can have no purpose except to inflame the racial feelings of voters"
is not permissible in representation elections, although statements on
racial matters which are "temperate in tone, germane and correct fac-
tually" will be tolerated. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 50
L.R.R.M. 1532 (Aug. 9, 1962).2
1. Two weeks before the election the employer mailed to its employees a large picture
showing a closeup of a Negro man dancing with a white lady; both were unidentified. The
picture was captioned in bold letters, "The C.I.O. Strongly Pushes and Endorses the
F.E.P.C." On the same day the employer also sent the employees a reproduction of a 1957
front page of the Jackson (Miss.) Daily News, featuring a four-column picture of a white
man dancing with a Negro lady. The picture was captioned:
UNION LEADER JAMES B. CAREY DANCES WITH A LADY FRIEND
He is President of the IUE
Which Seeks to Unionize Vickers Plant Here
Accompanying this picture was a story headed, "Race Mixing Is an Issue as Vickers Workers
Ballot." (The Board noted that the IUE was not the petitioner in the instant case.)
The employer also distributed to employees copies of a publication called Militant Truth
for four months preceding the election. This is a monthly paper, published in Greenville,
S.C. Samples of writing from Militant Truth follow:
"It isn't in the interest of our wage earners to tie themselves to organizations that
demand racial integration, socialistic legislation, and full range of communist conspirators.
"Another factor that merits consideration is the large percentage of union victories in
plants that employ all, or nearly all, Negro labor. Because the communists always operate
under the guise of being 'the great uplifters' of 'the underprivileged,' and promise social
equality to the Negro, it is easy to understand why many Negroes are more easily in-
fluenced and misled by the radical labor union organizers."
Two days before the election the employer's president sent a letter to employees saying
that one of the reasons he would vote against the union is that he would "object to paying
assessments so the union can promote its political objectives" such as the National Associa-
tion for 'the Advancement of Colored People and the Congress of Racial Equality. A week
previous to this the local newspaper had reprinted a letter signed by Walter Reuther and
James B. Carey, enclosing a check to CORE, to "be used in connection with expenses" of
the "Freedom Rides."
2. A Board majority refused to set aside an election in a companion case to Sewell,
which also involved racial propaganda. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 50
L.R.R.M. 1535 (Aug. 9, 1962). In that case the employer used two propaganda devices.
The first was a letter mailed to all employees, pointing out that the AFL-CIO, which in-
cluded the petitioner union, was trying to promote integration, and had given $75,000 from
its treasury to the NAACP. The second was a clipping from Militant Truth (see note 1
supra), also sent to all employees. This clipping dealt with allegations that the national
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The role of the NLRB in representation elections is more than
that of an industrial abacus. The Board determines whether the unin-
hibited wishes of the employees have been recorded. It has considered the
problem of employee freedom of choice from its earliest deliberations,'
and has set aside elections when it believed the integrity of its balloting
was violated.4 The Supreme Court has interpreted broadly the Board's
function in the conduct of elections.' The Board has said it tries to
establish a "laboratory" in which the free choice of employees could
most accurately be determined. This "laboratory conditions" test was
announced in General Shoe Corp.6 in 1948, probably the Board's most
cited case standard on the setting aside of elections. 7 But it is interesting
office of the union bad suspended local officials in Front Royal, Virginia, nearby the election
site in Allen-Morrison, for buying bonds to help finance a segregated school.
The decision to set aside the election in Sewell was 4-0. Member Rodgers did not
participate. The decision upholding the election in Allen-Morrison was 4-1. In the latter
case the Board majority said it was "applying the principles" of Sewell. It pointed out
that in Allen-Morrison the employer's letter was "temperate" and "advised the employees
as to certain facts," and that the "excerpt from Militant Truth concerned action taken by
the Union in this case in a nearby city." It concluded that it was "not able to say that
the Employer . . . resorted to inflammatory propaganda on matters in no way related" to
the election. Member Brown dissented in Allen-Morrison because he believed "application
of the criteria enunciated in the Sewell case requires the conclusion that in the circumstances
of this case the Employer exceeded the limits of permissible campaigning."
3. See, e.g., Interlake Iron Corp., 6 N.L.R.B. 780 (1938) ("objectionable" conduct "not
• . . conducive to maintaining a proper decorum" but the Board felt such conduct "will
not occur again" and did not upset the election).
4. An often-cited case from the earlier years is Continental Oil Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 169
(1944), which articulated the standard this way: "Elements, regardless of their source or
of their truth or falsity, which, in the experienced judgment of the Board, make impossible
an impartial test, are grounds for the invalidation of an election." Id. at 172 n.2. Cf. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 795 (1942), for a refusal to set aside an election, in a fact
pattern with particularly interesting public policy implications.
5. NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
309 U.S. 206 (1940). See also NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940).
6. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). The Board said that it was its "function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal
as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish
these conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled." Id.
at 127.
7. General Shoe was also interesting because the Board noted that the criteria for
setting aside elections were not identical with those for finding unfair labor practices. This
issue was further developed in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950), in
which the majority emphasized that section 8(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958), which provides that the expression of
any views shall not "constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . .. if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit," applied only to
complaint cases and not to representation cases. This rule was rendered doubtful in a series
of cases in the 1950's: Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955); L. G. Everist, Inc.,
112 N.L.R.B. 810 (1955); A. S. Abell Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 362 (1953); National Furniture
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953). See discussion of these cases in 18 GA. B.J. 219 (1955).
An amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act was introduced in Congress in 1954, providing that
the expression of any view without threat of reprisal or promise of benefit should not be the
basis for setting aside an election; however, the bill of which it was a part, S. 2650, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), was recommitted on May 7, 1954. 100 CONG. REC. 6202-03 (1954).
See comments on this provision in Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare on Taft-Hartley Act Revisions, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 3, at 2143 (George
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for the purposes of this note that a year earlier the Board set aside an
election in which a local citizens' committee made several threats and
innuendoes which included remarks with a racial tinge.8
Board decisions which set aside elections over the past decade pre-
sent a picture of judicial empiricism, straining to reduce to a formula a
delicate area concerning employee reactions which is knotty with specific
fact situations. The Board has built up semantic formulas over the
years, but the underlying patterns can be discerned, if at all, from the
facts of each case, not to mention the labor jurisprudence of individual
Board members. The Board's decision setting aside an election in United
Aircraft Corp. represents both the synthesis and germination of a
standard. The Board stressed that although "exaggerations, inaccuracies,
partial truths, name-calling, and falsehoods" might be "excused" though
not "condoned," it would set aside elections when the propaganda was
" 'so misleading' as to prevent the exercise of a free choice."1° The Board
also said that when employees were deprived of their "ability to recognize
propaganda for what it is" they became "helpless to exercise good sense
in appraising it."" Since United Aircraft, the Board has set aside elec-
tions in situations when a union issued handbills containing untruths
about the wages being paid under a nonexistent contract;' 2 when an
J. Bott, NLRB General Counsel); Vol. 4, at 2793 (Secretary Mitchell); Vol. 4, at 3092-93
(Arthur Goldberg, then CIO General Counsel).
The issue of whether section 8(c) applies in representation cases arose again, implicitly,
in a case involving a racial appeal, Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957),
in which Board Member Leedom, concurring, said that a threat or promise would be clear
grounds for setting aside an election-and cited section 8(c) I [In an unfair labor practices
case decided the same year, the Board adopted the findings, conclusions and recommenda-
tions of a trial examiner, who in dismissing unfair labor practice charges, noted that "as
the Board held in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . and in similar cases, it is not limited by
the provisions of Section 8(c) in determining whether or not a statement is of such nature
as to make the free selection of a bargaining representative improbable." Hicks-Hayward
Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 695, 697 (1957).]
Because of the holding in Sewell, and the apparent confusion on the alleged carryover
of section 8(c) to representation cases, the question arises in reversed fashion: Would the
propaganda used in Sewell necessarily be grounds for an unfair labor practice charge? Com-
pare Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949), with Happ Bros. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513
(1950), and Empire Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958).
8. P. D. Gwaltney, Jr., & Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947).
9. 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953). In this case the United Auto Workers, which won the
contested election, gave employees copies of a telegram purporting to come from Al Hayes,
Machinists' Union president, which apologized for "smearing" the UAW. In setting aside
the election, the Board said that "the UAW by its deliberate deception as to the source of
the 'telegram' so blinded the employees to the significance of its content that they could
neither recognize it as a fake nor evaluate it as propaganda." See also the Board's decision
in Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 790 (1952), for a variation on this theme.
10. United Aircraft Corp., supra note 9, at 104, citing Kearney & Trecker Corp., 96
N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), and Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 349 (1945).
11. United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 105 n.9 (1953).
12. Gummed Prod. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955). Cf. F. H. Snow Canning Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 714, 717-18 (1957), distinguishing Gummed Prod. on the basis that the authors
of the charge were not people particularly likely to have first hand knowledge of the
subject, and that the employees were "free to weigh the contents" of the propaganda
against a public repudiation by the petitioner union.
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employer announced a new vacation plan a week before the election
and persisted in publishing inaccurate material on union payroll deduc-
tions; 13 and when propaganda originated in the community reasonably
conveyed the view to employees that the plant would shut down if the
union won.' 4 The Board recently has emphasized a severe view of what
might be termed "prophecy threats"-employer "predictions" which
"generate a fear of economic loss,"' 5 as well as misrepresentations com-
bined with similar innuendoes.'
A parallel thread in Board history roughly defines the legitimate
boundaries of propaganda by emphasizing a laissez-faire role for the
Board.' The case of Stewart-Warner Corp." in 1953 synthesized the
semantic formula of what is permissible by stressing that the Board did
not police or censor election propaganda, and that it would not upset an
election when the employees "knew and could evaluate the source" of
propaganda and the objecting party had a chance to correct inac-
curacies.' 9 A year later, the Board upheld an election in which the
union complained of such conduct as store managers giving out con-
fidential information about a wage increase." The majority of a bitterly
divided Board said the Board must establish "ideal conditions insofar as
13. Bata Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1956). With respect to enticement, see also
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961) (payments to employees with request
to buy beer for their cohorts and persuade them to vote against the union). With respect
to inaccurate propaganda, compare Avon Prod., Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1729, decided the same
year as Bata, in which an employer's statement failed to mention a five-cent increase won
by the union at another plant. The Board said the employer's statement was "essentially
correct" and that the omission of the five-cent increase was not such "as to influence the
employees improperly or to prevent their exercise of a free choice."
14. For instance, a local paper's editorial was headed, "If the Union Comes--Lees
Goes." James Lees & Sons Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 290, 292 (1961), decided by a 3-2 vote. See
also Lake Catherine Footwear, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 48 L.R.R.M. 1683 (1961) (employer
plus community propaganda).
15. Storkline Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 49 L.R.R.M. 1666 (1962) ("I predict"
a loss of repeat orders). See also Myrna Mills, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 48 L.R.R.M. 1707
(1961) (question and answer in employer's letter to employees: Question: "Will the plant
close down if the Union gets in?" Answer: "We hope not, but our guess is the Union could
cause enough trouble to force the plant down like unions have done at so many places.").
Similarly, see Somismo, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 49 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1961) (employer's
speech: "There is no doubt in my mind there will be a strike [if the Union is voted in] ...
whether we go out of business or not I am not saying right now. Use your own judgment.").
16. Haynes Stellite Co., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 49 L.R.R.M. 1711 (1962). This decision
was based, inter alia, on the Board's finding that the employer had materially misrepre-
sented that "some" customers would seek other sources of supply if the plant was unionized,
whereas only one customer had so informed him.
17. Two much-cited early examples are Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1944),
and Maywood Hosiery Mills, Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 146 (1945). In these cases the Board was
confronted with propaganda which it granted to be "offensive and unethical" (58 N.L.R.B.
at 1443), or "objectionable" (64 N.L.R.B. at 151), but rested its faith in the ability of
employees to weigh the material.
18. 102 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1953). The employer in this case misrepresented that if em-
ployees elected the petitioner they would lose a four-cent increase because of a Wage
Stabilization Board ruling.
19. Id. at 1158.
20. Liberal Market, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481 (1954).
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possible" but that it must recognize that its elections "do not occur in
a laboratory where controlled or artificial conditions may be estab-
lished."'21 In succeeding cases, the Board refused to set aside elections
in situations when employers misrepresented wage rates won by the
union at a competitor's plant;22 threatened to bargain "from scratch";2"
and predicted that a certain group of employees would lose work if the
union won.24
It is against the background of these decisions on the validity of
elections generally that we may now refer to Board actions when the
racial issue is raised. The Board condemned both employers and unions
for remarks appealing to race prejudice in a series of cases in 1957 and
1958, but it refused to set aside the elections in those cases.25 The Board
did set aside an election in which a racial issue figured at least implicitly,
but its identification of that issue as a factor in its decision was at best
ambiguous.26 Another election was upset when the Board found unfair
21. Id. at 1482. Compare the quotation from General Shoe Corp., note 6 supra.
22. Kennametal, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 410 (1958), distinguishing Gummed Prod. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955), on the basis that in Kennametal, the wage rates were not the
type of information which the employees "believed was authoritatively known to the em-
ployer" or about which he would likely have "first-hand knowledge." See also DeVilbiss
Co. & Richard Glenn Platt, 115 N.L.R.B. 1164 (1956) (half-truths on union dues and
misrepresentation of union's position on certain matters; election upheld). Cf. Bata Shoe
Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1956), and Avon Prod., Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1729 (1956), discussed
at note 13 supra.
23. Universal Producing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 548 (1959).
24. Weil-McLain Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 19 (1961). See also Motec Indus., Inc., 136 N.L.R.B.
No. 74, 49 L.R.R.M. 1828 (1962). The Board there upheld an election in which the employer
sent a letter to employees saying that a vote for one of two unions would be "detrimental
to our mutual best interests," because the government was "wary" in selecting contractors
and "the wrong vote could jeopardize our ability to get as much of this work as we need."
It should be noted that the employer's letter gave a "personal guarantee" of job safety so
far as taking a position in the election was concerned, and that the union he attacked was
able to reply. The Board said that "in the circumstances, the employees were capable of
evaluating the employer's letter."
25. Paula Shoe Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 673 (1958) ("if you want to avoid that the Jew
Sandier continue to mistreat you, vote for UTM"); Chock Full 0' Nuts, 120 N.L.R.B. 1296
(1958) (company vice-president Jackie Robinson's remarks to Negro employees that he
"was the reason for the union" and that white employees were jealous of his position);
Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958) (letter similar in content to that in
Allen-Morrison, discussed note 2 supra; see especially the concurring opinion of Members
Leedom and Bean); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957) (decided prin-
cipally on procedural grounds; see especially Board Member Leedom's concurring opinion:
"to draw the issue along these !racial] lines does not effectuate the policies of the Act. The
implications are far greater . . . than the reaches of the Act, for they bespeak an assault
upon the spirit of our Constitution." (Emphasis added.)). See also Mead-Atlanta Paper Co.,
120 N.L.R.B. 832 (1958). Cf. P. D. Gwaltney, Jr. & Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947).
26. Heintz Division, Kelsey-Hayes Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 151 (1960). The intervenor
union, which opposed the petitioning union in the election, picked out eight men, five of
whom were Negroes, to distribute handbills asking employees to vote for the petitioner,
without any indication that it was the intervenor which was employing the men. The
election was set aside, but the Board does not speak directly of a racial issue. It simply
mentions fraud, trickery and depriving employees of "their ability to recognize propaganda
for what it is," and holds that the failure of parties to identify themselves as the sponsor
of propaganda is grounds for setting aside an election. See the critique of this case by
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labor practices in employer interrogations which included a remark with
racial overtones. 7 Further, the Board has found racial remarks to be
unfair labor practices when there was no representation issue per se
involved."8
The instant case represents the first time the Board has set aside
an election explicitly because of the use of racial propaganda. The de-
cision rests partly on the premise that the Board "not only conducts elec-
tions, but also oversees the propaganda activities of the participants...
to insure . . . a reasoned, untrammeled choice."129 The Board conceded
that "some appeal to prejudice of one kind or another" is inevitable in
any election. 0 But it postulated as "datum" that "prejudice based on
color is a powerful emotional force," and that it is "indisputable that a
deliberate appeal to such prejudice is not intended or calculated to en-
courage the reasoning faculty."'" Having set forth these premises, the
Board constructed a standard. Certain "moderate and truthful" remarks
which cater to race prejudice must be tolerated if they concern matters
about which employees are entitled to know.3 2 The Board will allow
these appeals if they are truthful and do not seek deliberately to in-
flame racial feelings, 3 but will set aside an election when the appeals are
unrelated to the issues in the election or the union's activities, and
are solely inflammatory in purpose. 4 Indeed, the Board placed the
burden on the party using the "racial message" to establish that it is
Prof. Michael I. Sovern in his magisterial article, The National Labor Relations Act and
Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 618 (1962). It is noted that less than twenty
of the 1,377 employees eligible to vote in the election were Negroes. Ibid.
27. Model Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1527 (1953), in which the employer told a colored
employee, inter alia, that he had heard that "in some plants after a union has been voted in,
the colored employees had been laid off." Compare the trial examiner's refusal to find an
unfair labor practice in the action of the company president who, during a speech, told a
Negro employee to sit -in his chair behind his desk and asked, "How would you like some-
one to come into your home and tell you how to run it?" Id. at 1534 (facts) ; id. at 1538
(finding).
28. Petroleum Carrier Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1960) (assistant manager said that
if the union came in he would hire a "nigger, cajun, wop or whatnot"); Empire Mfg.
Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958) (supervisor said that if union came in there would be
"hiring niggers"); Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949) (distribution of paper which
said "the Communist CIO" was "busy in the southern textile mills with their chief plan
and purpose of 'breaking down' the color line, and even to the extent of urging inter-
marriage between the Negroes and the whites .. ."). See also Granwood Furniture Co., 129
N.L.R.B. 1465 (1961) (foreman told two Negro employees about the possibility of their
being replaced with whites if the union won). But cf. Hal5p Bros. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513
(1950) (forelady told employees that if they "got tied up with the C.I.O. and John L.
Lewis, they'd work side-by-side with Negroes"; Board, though deprecating such remarks,
found no coercion).
29. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12, p. 5 (1962).
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id. at 8. The Board cites Sharnay Hosiery Mills, 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958), and
Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1962), as examples of moderate state-
ments.
33. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12, p. 8 (1962).
34. Id. at 7.
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truthful and germane and said it would resolve doubts against that
party. 5 Applying this standard to the instant case, the Board concluded
that the employer "calculatedly" mounted an inflammatory campaign so
the employees "would reject the Petitioner out of hand on racial grounds
alone." It drew this conclusion particularly from the propaganda photo-
graphs of mixed dancing and the news story on the Mississippi election
of 1957 which was appended to one of the photographs.36
This singular decision contains elements of high judicial drama,
combining two of the greatest areas of tension in American life. It is
significant for labor relations because of its emphasis on a trenchant view
of reality in the industrial process. This realism has appeared increasingly
of late in the Board's consideration of the impact of employer "predic-
tions" and propaganda in both unfair labor practices cases 7 and -repre-
sentation cases."8 In general, there is an indication that the Board is
reworking its views on the balance between employer "free speech" and
employee "freedom of choice." 39
Quite as meaningful is the relationship of this decision to the stream
of American thought which emphasizes a positive role for government
when racial issues create friction in society. The decision reflects the
climate of opinion of recent Supreme Court doctrine on race relations,
exemplified by the school segregation cases. Sewell Mfg. Co. may have
other judicial ancestors,4" but its direct progenitor is Brown v. Board of
Educ.4" Particularly interesting in this reference is the Board's declara-
tion that it is "datum" that color prejudice is a "powerful emotional
force" and "indisputable" that "a deliberate appeal to such prejudice
is not intended or calculated to encourage the reasoning faculty."42 Where
the Supreme Court in Brown supported the contention that "separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal" with authority from the
modern social sciences, 3 the appeal in Sewell seems to be a kind of
consensus of common sense.44 These differences in method aside, how-
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. at 9; see note 1 supra for a fuller description of this material.
37. See, e.g., Wilder Finishing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (1962); Alamo Linen Serv.,
136 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (1962).
38. See, e.g., The Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (1962).
39. For one Board member's ideas in this area, see Gerald A. Brown, "Freedom of
Choice and the National Labor Policy," speech before the Labor Law Section, State Bar
of Texas (July 5, 1962), excerpted 50 L.R.R.M. 249. The writer is also indebted to Board
Member Brown for some stimulating thoughts expressed on this general subject in a personal
conversation, week of August 13, 1962.
40. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), in which the Supreme Court
affirmed a conviction under an Illinois statute which made it illegal to publish certain kinds
of defamatory racial literature.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Seweli Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12, p. 7 (1962).
43. 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11 (1954).
44. Cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) ("those qualities which are in-
capable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school").
1962]
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ever, the underlying pattern is that of an emergent and general public
policy on racial matters,45 emphasizing a discerning view of educational
reality in the one case and of industrial reality in the other.4 6
The decision does present a yeasty group of problems, including
its implications for thought control. What is germane and reasonable to
one man may be irrelevant and intemperate to another."' Further, the
Board's realistic view of industrial elections may lose some value because
of its rather exclusive emphasis on the reasoning process. It is axiomatic
that reason should play a paramount role in any election, but does the
Board's focus on reason deny the connotations of its own prior language
about determining the "uninhibited desires" of employees? 48 It may
also be asked whether the requirement that electoral appeals be "truth-
ful" is sui generis to racial propaganda, a reversal of the Board's previous
language saying it will "excuse" but not "condone" falsehoods, 9 or
simply a single-case definition of the line where propaganda must stop.
Indeed, the boundary question of what is permissible will demand
future clarification. Assume a situation which combines certain elements
of the instant case and of its companion case: An employer mails a
picture of a union's international president dancing with a Negro lady
to employees whose votes are sought by that union's local. The picture,
innocuously captioned, is accompanied by a "reasoned" and truthful
presentation of the views of the union, which favors the immediate
"elimination of racial segregation from every phase of American life."5
Such a picture may well be called inflammatory in certain social con-
texts. But in Sewell's companion case,5  a Board majority tolerated
printed material of the kind hypothesized, finding it sufficiently germane
45. See Board Member Brown's speech, supra note 39, and Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB,
316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942), cited therein, on the Board's relationship to the "entire scope of
Congressional purpose."
46. But if the Board is attempting to cut through to the realities, it is not true, as
Prof. Sovern suggests, that "the nature of these utterances ...probably cannot be undone
by any remedies at our disposal," and that "the only truly effective way to prevent com-
panies from capitalizing on union fair employment policies is to require them to adhere
to the same sort of policies themselves"? Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and
Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 632 (1962). A partial answer to this ques-
tion is suggested by the idea that decisions such as the one in the instant case will have a
prophylactic effect for the future.
47. For instance, note that Member Brown dissented in Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138
N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1962) (see quotation note 2 supra). See also NLRB v. Stowe Spinning
Co., 336 U.S. 226, 230 (1949) on another subject: "We cannot equate a company-dominated
North Carolina mill town with the vast metropolitan centers .... "
48. See the language in General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), quoted note 6
supra.
49. See the language in United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953), quoted in text
accompanying note 10 supra.
50. This phrase, quoted from an AFL-CIO document, was used in one of the em-
ployer's letters in Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (Aug. 9, 1962), discussed
note 2 supra.
51. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., supra note 50.
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to the voters' choice. With the addition of the kind of picture described
above to the mailing, will relevance or flammability weigh heavier in the
Board's decision? It is true that a vital legal system demands judicial
consideration of many subtleties of human experience, yet the nature of
the hidden springs of political conduct in cases like these may strain
the capacity of any judicial or quasi-judicial body.
The writer believes that despite the problems this case raises, the
Board has sounded a healthy note for national policy. It has set a
standard, rough-hewn though it may be.
MARSHALL S. SHAPO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-UNUSUAL EXERTION
TEST FOR HEART CASES
The claimant, while engaged in his usual employment activities of
lifting, carrying and stacking cases of whiskey on a truck, suffered a
coronary occlusion. The deputy commissioner's order, which was affirmed
on appeal to the Florida Industrial Commission, granted compensation
on the ground that the claimant's injury was causally contributed to by
his employment. On certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, held,
reversed: a heart attack suffered by an employee while at his usual work
is not a compensable injury under the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Law. In heart cases, when the duties incident to the employment
precipitate a disabling heart attack, the injury is compensable only if the
employee was at the time subject to unusual strain or overexertion not
routine to the type of work he was accustomed to performing. Victor
Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
Under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, an injury is com-
pensable if it occurs by accident and arises out of and in the course of
the employment.' As early as 1903, judicial construction was given to
the term "accident." 2 The definition provided was "an unlooked-for mis-
hap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed."'3 This
interpretation of the English Workmen's Compensation Law, upon which
the Florida statute is based,4 has been favorably considered since its
rendition in both England and the United States.5
The Florida Supreme Court saw fit to further define the term by
requiring the injury to follow an unexpected or unusual event.6 This
I. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(6) (1961).
2. Fenton v. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C. 443.
3. Id. at 448.
4. Brown, Preface to FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMM'N, TE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW at v (1961).
5. Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242; 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW § 37.00 (1952).
6. McNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951) ; LeViness v. Mauer, 53 So.2d 113
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